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On the fourth of March 2011, the Post-Courier 
newspaper reported that the whole island of 
New Hanover (or Lavongai) in New Ireland 
Province, Papua New Guinea (PNG), was 
sold by a company called Tutuman Develop-
ment Ltd (TDL) to a Singaporean company 
called Palma Hacienda Ltd in June 2009 
for the princely sum of USD1.6 million. The 
source of this information was apparently 
a man called Ishmael Passingan, who was 
described in the report as the secretary of 
a landowner company called Central New 
Hanover Ltd. On the tenth of March, the 
Post-Courier carried another story, report-
ing that Central New Hanover Ltd was one 
of three landowner companies that had 
acquired Special Agricultural and Business 
Leases (SABLs) over different parts of the 
island in October 2007. The article said that 
these companies had subsequently issued 
sub-leases to TDL, and these were the com-
modities that had since been sold to Palma 
Hacienda Ltd. According to this story, the 
Secretary for Provincial and Local Level 
Government Affairs, Manasupe Zurenuoc, 
had asked his lawyers to investigate the sale. 
On the eleventh of March, the Post-
Courier carried two more stories about this 
case. One of them (which does not appear in 
the online version of the newspaper) report-
ed the content of a media release sent to the 
newspaper by Young and William Lawyers 
on behalf of the directors of TDL, including 
its chairman, Pedi Anis, who was the Pre-
mier of New Ireland Province from 1987 to 
1990. In this statement, Anis claimed that 
the allegation made against his company 
had come from “a minority group of Central 
New Hanover landowners” acting in concert 
with a foreign logging company called Grow-
max Ltd. By this account, Growmax Ltd had 
previously been operating under a contract 
with TDL, but this was terminated when it 
was found to have engaged in illegal logging 
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activities on the island. In the second news-
paper story published on the same day, Anis 
claimed that criticism of his plans to bring 
foreign investment to “the forgotten island 
of New Ireland Province” was motivated by 
the knowledge that he would be standing as 
a candidate for the Kavieng Open Elector-
ate in the 2012 national elections, and such 
uninformed criticism had already caused 
“bloodshed” in some villages.
In this paper, I explain this episode by 
reference to what I call the “new land grab” 
in PNG. I have already presented a general 
account of this phenomenon, along with 
case studies from Central and East New 
Britain provinces, in another publication 
(Filer 2011). A more detailed account of the 
way that customary land has recently been 
“grabbed” in New Ireland Province is partly 
warranted by public interest in the episode 
I have just recounted, and also by the fact 
that New Ireland is one of the provinces 
where this activity is both well entrenched 
and reasonably well documented. An 
examination of land grabbing in New Ireland 
can therefore help us to answer two of the 
key questions that have arisen in broader 
national debate about the land grab. The 
first is whether and why some customary 
landowners might have consented to the 
expropriation of their own land; the second 
is whether the formal unity of the legal 
process through which their land has been 
expropriated conceals a variety of motives 
and outcomes on the part of the actors who 
either support or oppose this process.
THE naTional land grab
The new land grab in PNG involves the use 
of a legal mechanism generally known as 
the “lease-leaseback scheme” to convert 
customary land rights into formal titles which 
are then allocated to private companies. 
Section 11 of the Land Act 1996 says that 
the Minister “may lease customary land for 
the purpose of granting a special agricultural 
and business lease of the land”, while section 
102 states:
… a special agricultural and business 
lease shall be granted: (a) to a person 
or persons; or (b) to a land group, busi-
ness group or other incorporated body, 
to whom the customary landowners 
have agreed that such a lease should 
be granted. 
Section 11 also states:
… an instrument of lease in the 
approved form, executed by or on 
behalf of the customary landowners, 
is conclusive evidence that the State 
has a good title to the lease and that 
all customary rights in the land, except 
those which are specifically reserved in 
the lease, are suspended for the period 
of the lease to the State. 
The lease-leaseback scheme has been 
used and abused in a variety of ways since 
it was first devised in 1979, but the recent 
surge in the grant of SABLs to private 
companies began in the period between the 
national elections of 2002 and 2007, and 
has accelerated over the past four years. In 
the eight years from 2003 to 2010, the total 
amount of customary land alienated to private 
companies through this scheme was just 
over 4.2 million hectares, but four new leases 
already gazetted in 2011 have brought the 
total to more than 5 million hectares, which 
is more than 10 per cent of PNG’s total land 
area (about 46 million hectares).
year no. Total area (ha.)
2003 1 11,800
2004 2 365
2005 3 44,094
2006 6 125,901
2007 16 475,618
2008 15 444,140
2009 10 1,154,842
2010 16 1,959,307
Total 69 4,215,848
Table 1:   Leasebacks to private 
              companies 2003–2010
Source: PNG National Gazette.
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Tables 1–3 show the temporal and 
spatial distribution of the different acts of 
expropriation that were announced in the 
national government gazette in the years 
from 2003 to 2010. Although there are 69 
different acts of expropriation documented in 
Tables 1 and 2, the number of development 
proposals associated with these transfers 
is considerably smaller than the number of 
gazetted leases, as can be inferred from the 
fact that several leases over adjacent areas 
have sometimes been issued on the same 
day, and even to the same corporate entity. 
Table 3 shows that the land grab has 
gone much further in some provinces than in 
others, and there are some provinces (such 
as Enga, Manus and Milne Bay) where 
it has not yet begun. New Ireland ranks 
fourth in terms of the proportion of its land 
area (14.19 per cent) that was grabbed be- 
tween 2003 and 2010. In this province, six 
SABLs were announced in the national gov-
ernment gazette during this period, but, as 
we shall see, the 141,529 hectares of land 
covered by these six leases are associated 
with four different development proposals, and 
two of these projects share the same architect.
Emirau
In December 2006, a SABL over an area of 
3384 hectares (Portions 53C–58C) on the 
island of Emirau in the Murat LLG area was 
size of lease area no. Total area
Very small (< 100 ha.) 6 330
Small (100 – 1000 ha.) 7 2,041
Medium (1000 – 10,000 ha.) 14 65,000
Large (10,000 – 100,000 ha.) 30 803,161
Extra large (>100,000 ha.) 12 3,345,316
Total 69 4,215,848
Table 2:  Size of areas covered by leasebacks  
              to private companies 2003–2010
Source: PNG National Gazette.
province Total area area converted % converted
Western 10,084,400 2,120,880 21.03
West Sepik 3,601,200 704,395 19.56
Oro 2,251,000 348,160 15.47
New Ireland 997,400 141,529 14.19
E. New Britain 1,567,800 177,545 11.32
Central+Capital 2,995,700 299,750 10.01
East Sepik 4,475,200 196,824 4.40
W. New Britain 2,101,200 89,794 4.27
Gulf 6,220,000 128,172 2.06
Morobe 3,309,000 8,374 0.25
S. Highlands 2,569,800 358 0.01
W. Highlands 889,700 65 0.01
Total 4,215,848
Table 3:  Provincial land areas covered by leasebacks to private 
              companies 2003–2010
Source: PNG National Gazette.
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granted to a company called Emirau Trust 
Ltd (ETL) for a period of 99 years. The six 
land portions included in this lease appear to 
cover the whole of the island, and the state 
is said to have acquired these land portions 
from 29 incorporated land groups in Janu-
ary 2005 (The National, 9 September 2008). 
The island is approximately 130 kilometres 
north-west of Kavieng, the provincial capital 
(see Map 1).
In May 2005, one of the islanders wrote a 
letter to one of PNG’s national newspapers 
expressing concern that the SABL had not 
yet been granted in April of that year (The 
National, 9 May 2005). According to this 
correspondent, ETL was the brainchild of 
the island’s most well-known political leader, 
Ben Micah, former MP for Kavieng Open 
Electorate and long-time supporter of former 
prime minister and fellow New Irelander, 
Sir Julius Chan.1 Micah was said to have 
been negotiating a deal with the national 
government and an Australian, Edward Carr, 
to invest millions of kina (hereafter PGK)
in a combination of “fishing, redevelopment 
of old World War II airfields on the island, 
tourism and communication development”. 
A certain amount of seed capital might have 
been required for this venture, since the 
correspondent also recorded that Micah 
had organized a “fundraising” event in Port 
Moresby in March 2005, and that is where 
he is said to have announced the imminent 
finalization of the leasing arrangements.
The national newspapers carried no fur-
ther news of this project until December 
2007, when an article entitled “Chan Eyes 
Riches” appeared in the Post-Courier. Sir 
Julius had re-entered the national parlia-
ment as Governor of New Ireland Province 
in July of that year, and was now announc-
ing “an integrated business strategy and 
practices which project immense monetary 
gains for the people of Emirau, Mussau, the 
Murat Local level government, New Ireland 
Province and the country” (Post-Courier, 
12 December 2007). 
The role of Emirau in this strategy was 
apparently derived from the island’s role 
as an American airbase during the Second 
World War, and ETL, under the chairmanship 
of a former pastor called Stephen Wilson, 
who was supposedly keen to bring this fact 
to the attention of potential foreign investors. 
In September 2008, Ben Micah submitted 
a proposal for what was now described 
as “Project Emirau” to the Department of 
Commerce and Industry (The National, 
9 September 2008). At the same time, Micah 
and Chan jointly issued a press release 
invoking New Ireland’s aim to become “a 
self-reliant autonomous part of Papua New 
Guinea that is efficient, market oriented and 
internationally competitive”, and “appealing to 
the Government to approve [Project Emirau] 
as a national public investment programme 
project, declare NIP a special economic zone 
and Emirau island a free trade and export 
processing zone”. However, the capacity 
of ETL to participate in this scheme may 
have been somewhat reduced when the 
Investment Promotion Authority removed the 
company from its company register in May 
2008 (Post-Courier, 16 October 2008).
ETL and Project Emirau have since van-
ished from the radar, except for a curious 
website maintained by Edward Car [sic], 
the Australian who appeared as a potential 
foreign investor in 2005, but who seems 
to regard himself as a “Total Artist” (http://
emirau.asia/index.html). Car says that he first 
visited Emirau Island in 2003 in his capacity 
as “the Leader of a Value Based Expedition 
run by WIND AUSTRALIA visiting the most 
distant point on the map that had land in the 
Pacific Ocean in the most remote corner of 
PNG”. Although he has some very general 
ideas about the island’s actual and potential 
place in the global capitalist system, Car 
represents Project Emirau as a joint venture 
between ETL and a company called Wind 
Trader Ltd (perhaps his own family company) 
to develop something called the “Emirau 
Mother’s Haus” (http://emirau.asia/e_house.
html). This is described as:
 … a contemporary modern living air 
conditioned high tech Home Office 
designed around the mother and her 
roll [sic] in the community [and] … a self 
sufficient building that provides its own 
Permaculture Food, Rain Water, Green 
Electricity, Grey and Black water treat-
ment, Methane for cooking and cooling 
and Telecommunications and Internet. 
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The cost of the building itself is estimated 
at USD30,000–40,000, but the cost of 
relocating all 600 islanders to a cluster 
of new buildings around it is estimated at 
USD4–5 million. The Total Artist believes that 
a bank loan used to finance the development 
of this new community infrastructure could 
be paid off within ten years: the cost of the 
new housing would be covered by the sale 
of “Export Organic Food and Water, Export 
Wild Fish, Boutique Accommodation and 
Electricity”, while the cost of the entire project 
could be covered by a “Building Material 
Production Plant” selling building materials 
“to the rest of Melanesia”, and the sale of 
other items like “Tuna Sashimi Fish” and 
“Medical Tourism” would simply add to the 
overall profitability of the scheme. 
It is not known whether or how these 
fantasies were included in Micah’s submission 
to the Department of Commerce and Industry 
or how they might figure in the latest iteration 
of New Ireland’s Provincial Development Plan. 
KauT
In December 2006, a SABL over 20,000 hect-
ares of land in the Tikana LLG area, south-
east of the provincial capital of Kavieng, was 
issued to a company called Cassava Etagon 
Holdings Ltd for a period of 99 years. This 
lease seems to include the 17,600 hectares 
over which local landowners granted tim-
ber harvesting rights to the state through a 
Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) agreement 
signed in June 1969, which expired in June 
2009. The state granted separate Timber 
Permits over the East Kaut area (6410 hect-
ares), which was logged in the 1980s, and 
the West Kaut area (11,190 hectares), which 
was logged in the 1990s.
Cassava Etagon Holdings Ltd is not a 
company registered with the PNG Invest-
ment Promotion Authority, but appears to be 
a wholly owned subsidiary of a South Korean 
company called Changhae Ethanol Corpora-
tion. In February 2007, another Changhae 
subsidiary, Changhae Tapioka (PNG) Ltd, 
map 1: New Ireland Province, showing towns and sites mentioned in the text. 
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was granted SABLs over seven areas of land 
totalling 12,913 hectares in the Rigo District 
of Central Province for a period of 40 years. 
Changhae’s declared interest in both provinc-
es is the production of ethanol from cassava 
and other crops. 
This investment had apparently been 
under discussion since 2003 (Post-Courier, 
25 July 2006). In February 2005, Prime 
Minister Michael Somare reportedly signed 
an agreement with Changhae that would 
grant the company 20,000 hectares of land 
in Central Province. Martin Aini, the MP for 
Kavieng Open Electorate (who incidentally 
hails from Lavongai), reportedly expressed 
his confidence that local landowners in 
his electorate would make at least 40,000 
hectares — perhaps as much has 80,000 
hectares — of land available for this purpose 
(The National, 7 February 2005). Shortly 
afterwards, surveyors were reportedly at work 
on the registration of 23 incorporated land 
groups so that 26,000 hectares of customary 
land could be part of a total of 43,000 
hectares which the New Ireland Provincial 
Government would provide for the investment 
(The National, 21 February 2005; Post-
Courier, 7 March 2005). In August that year, 
it was announced that similar work would be 
carried out in Central Province because the 
6000 hectares of state land attached to the 
Laulakalana agricultural station would need 
to be supplemented by 14,000 hectares 
of customary land in order to meet the 
government’s commitment to the investor 
(The National, 29 August 2005; Post-Courier, 
31 August 2005).
When the project agreements were first 
announced in 2005, the size of Changhae’s 
investment was valued at PGK82 million 
(USD26 million) (The National, 7 and 21 Feb-
ruary 2005). In 2005 and 2006, Korean 
newspapers reported that the PNG 
government had agreed to grant Changhae 
a local monopoly over ethanol production, 
along with a government subsidy of PGK30 
million and a variety of tax concessions into 
the bargain, while the company undertook to 
build five factories with a combined annual 
output of 200 million litres of ethanol (Moon 
Hong, personal communication, March 2009). 
In December 2006, the PNG newspapers 
reported that Changhae would invest 
USD6 million in the commercial cultivation 
of cassava, to be followed by construction 
of the first bio-ethanol plant at a cost of 
USD26 million, with the creation of 5000 
jobs for local people. The Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
reportedly said that domestic consumption 
of ethanol would help PNG to meet its 
greenhouse gas targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol, while Changhae’s chief executive 
officer reportedly said that the project 
would help local farmers to become “biofuel 
sheiks” (The National, 12 December 2006). 
In 2007, the Government declared that 
the Changhae project in Central Province 
was the first project to be supported and 
financed under the terms of the National 
Agriculture Development Plan (The National, 
23 April 2007). By that stage, the project in 
Central Province was said to have a total 
value of PGK283 million (or USD90 million) 
(The National, 24 April 2007).
The subsequent progress of Changhae’s 
investment in Central Province need not 
concern us here, although the company does 
seem to have made more progress than it 
has in the Kaut TRP area (Filer 2011). While 
Changhae seems to have gained access 
to a larger area of customary land in New 
Ireland Province, it has also met with some 
political opposition to its development plans 
for the area. When the Prime Minister, Sir 
Michael Somare, arrived to launch the project 
in April 2008, he was preceded by two other 
government ministers attempting to deal with 
“outstanding land issues”. The Prime Minister 
was also obliged to conduct a reconciliation 
ceremony with Martin Aini, the local MP who 
had supported the project in 2005 but had 
been sacked from his ministerial position in 
2007, while the Provincial Governor, Sir Julius 
Chan, simply absented himself from the pro-
ceedings (Post-Courier, 30 April 2008). Chan 
was later reported to oppose the project 
because “illegal logging in his province had 
cost the province millions and he was consid-
ering imposing a suspension on logging for 
an indefinite period” (Post-Courier, 13 May 
2008). This statement is somewhat ironic, 
since Chan had once been a champion of the 
logging industry in his own province, and the 
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area now being leased for the biofuel project 
had already been degraded by logging oper-
ations. However, local landowners were also 
complaining about a lack of consultation over 
the new land use proposals (Post-Courier, 
28 May 2008). Local informants have told me 
that Changhae’s plans for the Kaut area con-
tinue to be thwarted by land disputes.
Land disputes are not a new phenomenon 
in the Kaut TRP area. In 1989, I sent a group 
of students from the University of PNG to con-
duct a mid-term evaluation of a New Zealand-
funded Demonstration Reforestation Project 
in the area covered by the East Kaut Timber 
Permit. They found that the local landowners 
were not planting any trees at all because 
they were too busy disputing the distribution 
of royalties from the logging operation which 
had previously been undertaken in the area 
(Filer 1989). Similar disputes may well have 
occurred in the wake of the subsequent log-
ging operation in the West Kaut area. And 
this is where TDL enters the picture.
It appears that TDL assumed control of 
logging operations in the Kaut TRP area 
in the year 2000, and exported more than 
72,000 cubic metres of logs from the area 
over the course of the next four years, at 
prices which appeared to be remarkably low 
by PNG standards. This sparked a degree of 
speculation about the possible existence of 
a transfer pricing scheme to which officers of 
the National Forest Service may have turned 
a blind eye because two of its former staff 
members were now working for the company 
(Anon.: 2003). The Forests Minister sought 
to refute this argument by pointing out that 
the area had been damaged by fire in 1997, 
and the low price of the logs being exported 
was due to it being a “salvage operation” 
undertaken in preparation for the develop-
ment of an oil palm plantation. However, the 
critics maintained that the records produced 
by SGS PNG Ltd, the company engaged by 
the government to monitor raw log exports, 
did not warrant the claim that these were low-
grade logs (Anon.: 2004). 
It is not clear when TDL finished its logging 
operation in the Kaut TRP area, but by 2007 it 
was already operating in two other TRP areas 
between Konos and Namatanai (see Map 1). 
In that year, the company exported almost 
23,000 cubic metres of logs from the Central 
New Ireland TRP area, which covers 98,100 
hectares, and more than 15,000 cubic metres 
from the adjacent Konogogo TRP area, which 
covers a much smaller area of only 1315 
hectares (SGS 2008). While the TRP agree-
ment for the Central New Ireland area is not 
due to expire until 2017, the agreement for 
the Konogogo area expired in 2002, so it is 
not entirely clear what form of approval might 
have been granted for the logging of this area. 
To the best of my knowledge, neither of these 
two areas has ever been covered by a SABL.
In January 2005, it was reported that TDL 
had already been logging in the vicinity of 
Kono village for several months, and local 
landowners were complaining to their MP, 
Byron Chan,2 that the company had failed 
to keep its promise to reforest the area and 
improve the local road network (Post-Courier, 
25 January 2005). It therefore seems likely 
that TDL had moved its logging equipment 
from Kaut to Central New Ireland at some 
point in 2004. In January 2007, it was report-
ed that “a party of Masi villagers led by their 
leader and former Defence Force academic 
instructor … William Bartley” had put a stop 
to TDL’s logging operation because of the 
damage done to local waterways (Post-
Courier, 16 January 2007). On this occasion, 
provincial forestry officials and police officers 
were said to have descended on the area 
to “demand” that local landowners lift their 
blockade. To judge by the volume of logs 
exported in 2007, TDL was able to keep its 
equipment busy for some months after this 
encounter, but there is no official record of 
logs being exported from the area since then.
danfu
In October 2007, on the same day that 
three SABLs were granted over the island 
of Lavongai, a fourth was granted over an 
area of 24,581 hectares in the Namatanai 
LLG area, southeast of Namatanai town, to 
a company called Rakubana Development 
Pty Ltd for a period of 99 years. It has since 
transpired that the area covered by this lease 
approximates the Danfu Extension TRP area 
(25,400 hectares), over which the TRP agree-
The New Land Grab in Papua New Guinea
8
ment between the landowners and the state 
was signed in 1987 and expired in 1997.3
In December 2008, TDL produced an 
Environmental Impact Statement for what it 
described as the “Danfu Special Agriculture 
& Business Lease Area”.4 Not long after-
wards, the company submitted a develop-
ment plan for what was now described as 
the “Danfu Integrated Agro-Forestry Project” 
to the PNG Forest Authority (PNGFA) by 
way of application for a Forest Clearing 
Authority under Section 90B of the Forestry 
Act (as amended in 2007). This second doc-
ument included letters of endorsement from 
the New Ireland Provincial Administrator, the 
Director of the Provincial Division of Primary 
Industry, and the President of the Namatanai 
LLG Council, all written in the month of 
February 2009. The project was granted an 
Environment Permit in August 2009 and a 
Forest Clearing Authority in September.5
The project proposals submitted to the 
national government describe Rakubana as 
a company owned by sixteen or seventeen 
incorporated land groups, representing a 
population of some 2000 landowners, which 
has agreed to sub-lease its land to TDL, 
although no copy of the sub-lease agree-
ment was attached to either proposal. Both 
documents describe TDL itself as a 51 per 
cent nationally owned company, originally 
incorporated in 1999. However, the second 
document states that 49 per cent of the 
shares are owned by a Malaysian woman, 
Mrs Regina Hii, who is the company’s chief 
executive officer, while the remaining shares 
are divided equally between four other share-
holders, one of whom is another Malaysian, 
Mr Deodatus Hii. By this account, Mr and Mrs 
Hii own 61.75 per cent of the shares between 
them, while the rest are divided equally 
between the chairman (Pedi Anis) and the 
other two Papua New Guinean shareholders 
(TDL 2009b: 14).
TDL was proposing a five-year salvage 
logging operation, with an annual harvest 
of roughly 70,000 cubic metres of timber, 
of which 50,000 cubic metres would be 
exported as raw logs, while the balance 
would be processed onshore by small-scale 
sawmills and sold on the domestic market. 
In the course of this operation, an area of 
around 15,000 hectares would be clear-felled 
each year and replaced by some combination 
of commercial timber, hybrid cocoa and 
coconut plantations. In the Environmental 
Impact Statement, this proposal was justified 
by reference to the National Government’s 
“Export Driven Economic Recovery Policy, 
Sustainable Development Policy, National 
Forest Policy … ‘Green Revolution’ Strategy 
… Poverty Alleviation Strategy and other 
related policies under the Medium Term 
Development Strategy” (TDL 2008b: 16) .
TDL actually started to export logs from 
the TRP area in June 2008. By the end of 
that year it had exported more than 23,000 
cubic metres, and over the course of the 
next two years it exported another 48,000 
cubic metres (SGS 2009, 2010, 2011). It 
may seem rather odd that logs were being 
shipped out of the area for a period of fifteen 
months before the grant of a Forest Clearing 
Authority, and so it might have seemed to the 
PNGFA. In July 2008, the PNGFA is reported 
to have issued TDL with a stop-work order 
on the grounds of its failure to comply with 
the relevant provisions of the Forestry Act. 
The company is said to have challenged this 
order in the National Court on the grounds 
that it was operating on private land over 
which the PNGFA had no jurisdiction and 
more than 120 workers would have to be 
laid off if the logging operation were to be 
suspended (The National, 4 August 2008). 
Whatever the outcome of the court proceed-
ings, the logging operation seems to have 
continued in the months that followed, and 
TDL seems to have obtained a licence to 
export the logs (SGS 2009).
In March 2009, officers of the national 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock and 
the New Ireland Provincial Administration 
seem to have conducted a public hearing in 
one of the local villages in order to ascertain 
the level of popular support for the project, as 
is required under the regulations pertaining 
to the grant of Forest Clearing Authorities 
(PNGP 2008). National newspaper coverage 
of this event appears to have been informed 
by a press release subsequently issued 
by TDL chairman Pedi Anis, although the 
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company representatives who spoke at the 
meeting were said to have been Miskus 
Maraleu and Janette Rauveve (The National, 
19 March 2009).6 It was reported that part of 
the area covered by the SABL — apparently 
the portion dedicated to the production 
of hybrid cocoa — would be divided into 
200-hectare blocks allocated to each of the 
seventeen incorporated land groups holding 
shares in Rakubana Ltd, with smaller areas 
(5–8 hectares) allocated to individual clan 
members, and that TDL would not sub-lease 
this land, but would only purchase and market 
the cocoa. Pedi Anis was reported to have said 
that “the majority of the land and resource-
owning clans had unanimously supported the 
initiative”. Since no dissenting voice has since 
found its way into the pages of the national 
newspapers, this could well be true. 
lavongai
Thus we return to the island of Lavongai (see 
Map 1). In October 2007, three SABLs were 
granted over different parts of the island, and 
although they do not cover the whole island, 
they do cover more than 75 per cent of it.7 
The largest of the three leases — covering 
an area of 56,592 hectares in the middle of 
the island — is the one that was granted to 
Central New Hanover Ltd. The second larg-
est — covering an area of 25,108 hectares on 
the western side of the island — was granted 
to another landowner company called Umba-
kul Ltd. And the smallest — covering an area 
of 11,864 hectares on the northern side of the 
island — was granted to a third landowner 
company called Tabut Ltd. 
The area covered by the lease to Central 
New Hanover Ltd is described in the 1996 
National Forest Plan (PNGFA 1996) as a 
“potential area for future development”, which 
means that it had not so far been subject to 
a large-scale logging operation. There is no 
evidence to indicate that the state has since 
acquired timber harvesting rights over this 
area through a Forest Management Agree-
ment with the customary landowners. The 
area covered by the lease to Umbakul Ltd is 
known to the PNGFA as the Umbukul forest 
area. This area is subject to a TRP agree-
ment between the state and the customary 
landowners that was signed in June 1992 
and is due to expire in June 2012. The area 
covered by the lease to Tabut Ltd is known 
to the PNGFA as the Mamirum forest area. 
This area was subject to a TRP agreement 
that was signed in October 1974 and expired 
in October 1989. As we shall see, both areas 
have previously been subject to controversial 
logging operations.
By April 2010, Tutuman Development 
Ltd had asked the PNGFA to grant Forest 
Clearing Authorities for the “Central New 
Hanover Integrated Agro-Forestry Project” 
and the “Tabut-Mamirum Integrated Agri-
culture Project”. PNGFA records indicate 
that both requests had been referred to the 
New Ireland Provincial Forest Management 
Committee for its “deliberation”, and that 
committee had deferred its decision “pending 
a 2nd Public Hearing to gauge landowner 
views”. At that stage, TDL had not applied for 
an FCA over the area leased to Umbakul Ltd. 
As in the case of the Danfu area, the 
absence of an FCA did not prevent TDL from 
undertaking logging operations in the two 
areas over which it had applied for one. The 
company exported more than 36,000 cubic 
metres of logs from the Tabut-Mamirum area 
in 2007, and almost 18,000 cubic metres 
in 2008 (SGS 2008, 2009). In April 2008, it 
also managed to export about 8000 cubic 
metres of logs from the Central New Hanover 
area (SGS 2009). These exports may have 
been authorized through the grant of multiple 
Timber Authorities to local landowner com-
panies in accordance with section 87 of the 
Forestry Act. There is no official record of 
TDL exporting any logs from Lavongai in 
2009 or 2010 (SGS 2010, 2011).
TDL produced an Environmental Inception 
Report for the Central New Hanover agro-
forestry project in 2008,8 which was followed 
by a full Environmental Impact Statement in 
November 2009. No equivalent documents 
have so far been discovered for the Tabut-
Mamirum project. The documents relating to 
the Central New Hanover project bear a close 
resemblance to those that were submitted for 
the Danfu project (TDL 2008b, 2009b), and 
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the Lavongai project is justified by reference 
to the same set of national policies and strat-
egies, with the Fourth Goal of the National 
Constitution thrown in for good measure 
(TDL 2009a: 16).9 As in the case of the Danfu 
project, the crux of the proposal is a salvage 
logging operation lasting five (or possibly ten) 
years, with part of the logged-over area to 
be clear-felled and replaced by a mixture of 
cash crops. The annual log harvest volume 
is estimated to be just over 43,000 cubic 
metres (TDL 2009a: 7). The Environmental 
Inception Report says that 19,000 hectares 
of cocoa, coconut and oil palm will be planted 
over a ten-year period, while another 14,000 
hectares will be reforested (TDL 2008a: 1), 
but the Environmental Impact Statement 
reduces the extent of new timber plantations 
to around 4000 hectares (TDL 2009a: 34) 
and says that 15,000 or 16,000 hectares will 
be planted with oil palm, leaving only 3000 
hectares for cocoa and coconuts (ibid.: 5, 7). 
Clearance of forests in the adjacent Umbukul 
and Tabut-Mamirum areas will then enable 
the new oil palm plantations to cover a total 
of 20,000 hectares (ibid.: 30). The Environ-
mental Impact Statement says that shares 
in Central New Hanover Ltd are owned by 
25 incorporated land groups representing 
10,000 customary landowners (ibid.: 5, 62), 
but the Environmental Inception Report indi-
cates that only eleven of these sharehold-
ing groups would represent the customary 
owners of the land cleared for commercial 
agriculture (TDL 2008a: 1).
Palma Hacienda Ltd appears in the 
Environmental Impact Statement as a Malay-
sian, not a Singaporean, company, and is 
described as the local subsidiary of another 
Malaysian company called Ayamkuat Maju 
Sdn Bhd (TDL 2009a: 19). The latter is said 
to have planted more than 5000 hectares 
of oil palm on state land in Sarawak, and 
its local subsidiary had supposedly made a 
commitment to cover more than 80 per cent 
of the PGK175 million which it would cost 
to develop the agricultural component of the 
agro-forestry project over a five-year period, 
which would not include the cost of the logging 
equipment already owned by TDL (ibid.: 20). 
The inference would seem to be that Palma 
Hacienda would take sole responsibility for 
the capital cost of Lavongai’s new oil palm 
scheme, while TDL would be responsible for 
all the other components of the project, which 
might make sense in light of its undertakings 
in the Danfu area.
The Environmental Impact Statement 
clarifies the role of Miskus Maraleu as a 
“company representative” by representing 
him as TDL’s lawyer (TDL 2009a: 118). Mr 
Maraleu has an interesting track record in 
the development of New Ireland’s timber 
resources — not least on the island of 
Lavongai. “Timber Exploitation in New Ireland” 
was the subject of one of seven interim 
reports produced by the PNG Government’s 
Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Forestry Industry in 1989. In the years cov-
ered by the Commission’s investigation of this 
subject (1986 and 1987), Mr Maraleu was the 
chairman of the PNG Investment Corporation, 
acting chairman of the Forest Industries 
Council, principal of a timber consultancy 
company called Metepikai Holdings Pty Ltd, 
and director of a logging company called 
Sakai Management Ltd. The Commission 
found that Mr Maraleu’s role in the exploita-
tion of New Ireland’s timber resources was 
“disgraceful and reprehensible”, and that 
“he personally benefitted financially from the 
improper roles he played” (PNGP 1989b: 92). 
One of these roles was to provide legal advice 
to a landowner company called Mamirum 
Timbers Pty Ltd, which purported to represent 
the landowners of the Mamirum TRP area, 
and was looking for a logging company to 
harvest the timber which it contained (PNGP 
1989a: 3). Another role was to provide con-
sultancy advice to a logging company called 
Malaysia Overseas Investments Ltd, and to 
arrange a Logging and Marketing Agreement 
between the two companies which he was 
advising. The Commission found that this not 
only constituted a conflict of interest (ibid.: 
5) , but that Maraleu “had disregarded the 
interests of his own people who were his 
clients and served the interests of his foreign 
paymaster” in order to obtain an improper per-
sonal benefit (ibid.: 27, 34). The Commission 
visited the site of the log export facilities at 
Tabut village in September 1987 and bore 
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witness to a scene of severe social disloca-
tion and environmental damage as a result of 
the logging company’s failure to comply with 
the agreement which Maraleu had negotiated 
(ibid.: 9–10, 26).
The Commission of Inquiry made no criti-
cism of Pedi Anis or any of the other current 
directors of TDL (which was incorporated ten 
years after the Commission had reported), 
and Miskus Maraleu may well have mended 
his ways in light of the Commission’s find-
ings. However, the social and environmental 
impact of the short-lived logging operation in 
the Mamirum TRP area, as well as the one 
which followed in the Umbukul TRP area, 
might help explain the reservations some 
local people now hold about the latest round 
of development proposals.
The ink was barely dry on the Umbukul 
TRP agreement when the national Forests 
Minister, Jack Genia, granted a Timber 
Permit over the area to a Malaysian company 
called Dominance Resources in June 1992. 
This was one of numerous concessions 
which he granted in the month before the 
Forestry Act of 1991 was belatedly brought 
into effect and removed most of the minister’s 
discretionary powers. In April 1993, the 
Minister for Environment and Conservation, 
Parry Zeipi, denied that he had approved 
the company’s Environmental Plan for the 
area (Times of PNG, 8 April 1993), but his 
approval was forthcoming shortly afterwards 
(Post-Courier, 18 May 1993). At that 
juncture, Dominance Resources planned to 
harvest and export more than 350,000 cubic 
metres of logs from the area over a three-
year period (Times of PNG, 8 April 1993), 
but the logging operation did not last much 
more than two years, and only 114,000 
cubic metres of logs were exported during 
that period (Filer, 1997: 247). In July 1995, 
it was reported that the local landowner 
company, Wemaso Pty Ltd, had called a halt 
to the logging operation on the grounds that 
Dominance Resources had failed to comply 
with the conditions attached to its Timber 
Permit (Post-Courier, 4 July 1995).
During 1993 and 1994, dissident land-
owners associated with a body known as 
the Umbukul TRP Committee took various 
measures to halt or disrupt the logging opera-
tion. They complained about the poor quality 
of the company’s Environmental Plan (Post-
Courier, 13 May 1993), they took legal action 
to invalidate the TRP agreement on the 
grounds that most landowners had not given 
their informed consent to it (Post-Courier, 
22 June and 1 December 1993), and one 
group of villagers (from a small offshore 
island) took direct action to prevent the logs 
from being shipped abroad (Post-Courier, 
10 February 1994). At the time, these actions 
were opposed or disowned by spokesmen 
for the local landowner company (Post-
Courier, 19 May 1993), by Pedi Anis in 
his capacity as New Ireland’s Resources 
Minister (Post-Courier, 28 February 1994), 
and by Janette Rauveve in her capacity as 
Provincial Assistant Secretary for Forests 
(Post-Courier, 2 February 1994). For their 
part, the lawyers representing Dominance 
Resources in the court case argued that the 
plaintiffs were “absentee landowners” with 
questionable rights in the TRP area (Post-
Courier, 4 and 9 May 1994), echoing the 
claim previously made by Wemaso chair-
man Sition Tokava that the Umbukul TRP 
Committee was “a Port Moresby-based 
group” (Post-Courier, 19 May 1993).
Two academic members of this group 
later wrote a paper in which they observed 
that the board of Wemaso Pty Ltd bore 
a remarkable resemblance to that of its 
predecessor, Mamirum Timbers Ltd 
(Miskaram & Isana 1997: 24). They said that 
the company was effectively controlled by 
four prominent individuals, one of whom, “due 
to his previous involvement with the devel-
opers of the Mamirum TRP and, with other 
timber developers in other parts of Papua 
New Guinea and the Forest Industry”, had 
been responsible for engaging Dominance 
Resources to assess the feasibility of build-
ing a road around the island of Lavongai 
(ibid.: 30). The authors went on to say 
that Wemaso’s directors were charging the 
logging company between PGK10,000 and 
PGK20,000 a year for “advice, mediation and 
consultancy”, that these fees may or may not 
have been deducted from the timber royalties 
payable to local landowners, but that one 
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director had evidently done quite well out of 
the arrangement, because he had: 
… built himself a large permanent 
house, bought a twenty-three-feet [Y]
amaha boat and a 40 horsepower out-
board motor, adopted a large trade 
store which was initially established 
by Dominance Resources and handed 
over to Wemaso … [and] launched 
a new cocoa seedlings programme 
aimed at extending his smallholder 
cocoa plot. (ibid.: 33). 
The source of this last observation was 
a newspaper article, which reported that 
Pedi Anis had been on hand to witness the 
transfer of the trade store to Wemaso’s 
managing director, Micah Kusak (Times of 
PNG, 14 October 1993). Mr Kusak had 
formerly been the managing director of 
Mamirum Timbers Ltd (PNGP 1989a: 13), and 
was therefore a known associate of Miskus 
Maraleu, who was described in national 
newspaper articles as a “consultant” to 
Dominance Resources at the time when Pedi 
Anis was complaining about the blockade of 
the logging company’s shipping route (Post-
Courier, 10 & 28 February 1994).
The failure of Dominance Resources to 
build anything remotely resembling a road 
around the island of Lavongai seems to have 
precipitated the breakdown in relationships 
between the logging company and its 
erstwhile local allies in the middle of 1995 
(Post-Courier, 16 June 1995). By that time, 
the legal dispute about the validity of the TRP 
agreement had evidently run out of steam. In 
November 1996, a man called Sition Kepas 
from Umbukul village recalled that:
 … [a]ttempts to sue the company 
(Dominance) on the 7/12/93 was all 
quenched when the consultant to 
the developer and who is also at the 
receiving end in all benefits made an 
invalid pledge to pay each plaintiff 
K20,000.00 as a token of appreciation 
if they withdrew the suit or case 
against Dominance Resources Pty Ltd. 
(Miskaram & Isana 1997, Appendix 3). 
It is not clear whether the plaintiffs settled 
out of court or whether the court itself 
made a ruling that put an end to the 
dispute. However, some of the individuals 
formerly associated with the Umbukul TRP 
Committee are now to be counted in the 
ranks of Lavongai people opposed to the 
development plans of TDL.
One such is Tukul Walla Kaiku, a long-
time Port Moresby-based public servant who 
hails from Meteran village on the south 
coast of Lavongai.10 Ms Kaiku was one of 
three Lavongai people who wrote to the 
Minister for Environment and Conservation 
to complain about the quality of the 
Umbukul Environmental Plan in March 1993 
(Miskaram & Isana 1997, Appendix 1). In 
March 2010, she wrote a letter to one of the 
national newspapers lamenting the lack of 
response to letters which she and others had 
previously written to the Provincial Governor, 
the national Lands Minister, and officials of 
the Lands Department in protest over the lack 
of consultation behind the grant of the three 
Special Agricultural and Business Leases in 
October 2007 (Post-Courier, 31 March 2010).
Shortly afterwards, the same newspaper 
carried a feature article, also written by Ms 
Kaiku, which described the contest between 
TDL’s supporters and opponents as a 
“hornet’s nest” (Post-Courier, 21 April 2010). 
In this piece she observed that the word 
tutuman means “honest” in the vernacular 
language of Lavongai, but questioned 
whether this is a word which the “Moresby 
community of New Hanover people” would 
apply to the process by which TDL had been 
advancing its project proposals. Her article 
quoted a statement from this group in which 
they complained that the Lands Department 
had failed to respond to “pleas in late 2007 
and early 2008 from the majority of people 
of New Hanover for the revocation of the 
gazette [containing notification of the SABLs] 
due to no correct procedures being taken 
for the registering of lands and nil surveying 
of the lands”, and went on to complain that 
“[s]ome of the people who are party to the 
Environmental Impact Statement that was 
submitted to the Department of Environment 
and Conservation were involved in the 
last two logging ventures on New Hanover 
Island”.11 On the other hand, she did make 
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some attempt to tell both sides of the story by 
also quoting some of the questions that Pedi 
Anis had put to the “Moresby community” 
about the extent of their own investment in 
the development of Lavongai.
The newspaper reports which appeared 
in March this year provoked an intense, 
and even anguished, round of emails and 
meetings between dissidents based in Port 
Moresby, Kavieng, and some of the vil-
lages on Lavongai. It is somewhat ironic 
that communications between Moresby and 
Kavieng were then disrupted for several days 
when traditional landowners closed Kavieng 
airport until the government in Moresby 
agreed to keep its earlier promise to pay them 
several million kina as extra compensation 
for the land which they had lost in the 
development of Kavieng town (The National, 
12 April 2011). But in the meantime, the 
dissident cause was bolstered by the public 
intervention of Governor Chan, who issued 
a press release complaining about all six of 
the SABLs granted to private companies in 
his province, accusing the Lands Department 
of “giving Papua New Guinea away to fly-by-
night loggers” and demanding:
…   a full inquiry into the leases  
already issued, how they were 
issued and why there has not been 
consultation with the provinces and 
landowners …   [so that] those in 
the Lands Department responsible 
for these irresponsible and probably 
illegal activities must answer for their  
actions and be brought to justice  
(Post-Courier, 4 April 2011).12
conclusion
To what extent does the new land grab in New 
Ireland Province exemplify the larger process 
that has been enacted in PNG as a whole? 
I would argue that the first two of the six 
SABLs described in this paper are anomalies 
or outliers — one of them literally so — while 
the four promoted by Tutuman Development 
Ltd are more typical of the so-called “agro-
forestry” projects which Sir Julius has chosen 
to describe as gifts to “fly-by-night loggers”.
The project associated with the grant 
of a SABL to Emirau Trust Ltd is certainly 
the most peculiar of the schemes that have 
been used to justify and of the recent 
land grabs in PNG — so much so that the 
Governor seems to have forgotten his own 
endorsement of it when drafting his press 
release in March 2011. The cassava biofuel 
project associated with the grant of a SABL 
to Cassava Etagon Holdings Ltd is quite 
the opposite, in the sense that it seems to 
involve a reputable foreign investor with a 
rational development plan. However, this 
project and its counterpart in Central Prov-
ince are quite untypical of the “agro-forestry” 
projects associated with recent applications 
of the lease-leaseback scheme because the 
land in question does not appear to contain 
any native forests with unexploited commer-
cial timber resources, so the Governor was 
probably wrong to imply that this is a logging 
project disguised as a form of large-scale 
agricultural development (Filer 2011).
The implication holds more weight in 
the case of TDL’s development proposals, 
since all four SABLs contain substantial 
areas of native forest with unexploited com-
mercial timber resources, even if some parts 
of this forest have already been logged. In 
this respect, the four landowner companies 
operating in partnership with TDL appear to 
be part of that larger group of companies 
whose SABLs hold some attraction for the 
logging industry, and whose combined hold-
ings account for more than 90 per cent of the 
area converted to private ownership through 
this mechanism over the course of the past 
eight years.
What is more unusual about TDL’s devel-
opment proposals is that none of them seems 
to have received the active support of any 
members of the national parliament since 
2002, and certainly not the three (including 
the Governor) who currently represent New 
Ireland Province. On the other hand, TDL 
itself is rather unusual as a “development 
partner” in the promotion of agro-forestry 
projects because it is chaired by a prominent 
political leader, even if its own claim to be 
a 51 per cent nationally owned company 
appears to be some way off the mark. It is 
perhaps because Pedi Anis and the two other 
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national directors of this company, as well 
the company’s legal adviser, have such a 
long record of engagement with the logging 
business in New Ireland that they are able 
to move their proposals forward without the 
support of a government minister or other 
national MP. Indeed, TDL has proven to be 
quite adept at maintaining the flow of logs 
from a succession of “salvage” logging opera-
tions, whether or not these are notionally 
covered by the grant of a SABL, and despite 
the complaints of successive groups of local 
landowners.
It is hard to see how these operations 
could proceed without some measure of 
initial consent on the part of some local land-
owners. The company’s ability to secure this 
consent appears to be a function of the time 
it takes for educated community members 
living in urban areas to mobilize local opposi-
tion, or of the time it takes for local villagers 
themselves to realize that they are getting a 
raw deal. Nevertheless, it still seems odd that 
local landowners can be taken for a ride by 
the promise of “agro-forestry”, given the long 
history of promises made and broken by log-
ging companies in New Ireland. Perhaps the 
simple solution to this puzzle is that villagers 
have grown increasingly desperate for some 
form of rural development and they do not 
have any other options on offer (McCallum & 
Sekhran 1997). 
In this respect, the political contest over 
logging on Lavongai is unusual, not only 
for its longevity, but also for the persistence 
and resilience of many of the key players. 
None of the agro-forestry project proposals 
associated with SABLs in other parts of 
the country has played a comparable role 
in reigniting public debates which first took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s. The publicity 
gained by land use debates on Lavongai 
is itself partly a reflection of the number of 
highly educated people who originate from 
that island (Miskaram & Isana 1997). But 
these debates have also persisted because 
the core points at issue have never been 
settled in favour of one side or the other, 
which is why some parts of the island have 
been logged for short periods of time, but 
most of the rest remains a source of lasting 
temptation to the logging industry.
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EndnoTEs
1. When Chan was Deputy Prime Minister 
between 1992 and 1994, he was 
instrumental in the appointment of Micah to 
chair the body responsible for drafting a new 
Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local-level Governments. 
2. Byron Chan, the son of Sir Julius, was first 
elected as the MP for Namatanai Open 
Electorate in 2002.
3. This area was treated as an “extension” 
to the original Danfu TRP area (59,565 
hectares), which lies immediately to the 
southeast. The Danfu TRP agreement was 
signed in 1979, but while this agreement 
does not expire until 2019, the concession 
has not been subject to large-scale logging 
operations in recent years. 
4. It is not clear when the PNG Department 
of Environment and Conservation actually 
received this document.
5. PNGFA records indicate that TDL, unlike 
most of the other proponents of “agro-
forestry” projects, was not required to pay 
a performance bond as a condition of the 
FCA being granted.
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6. In the development plan submitted to the 
PNGFA, Mrs Rauveve is described as 
one of TDL’s national shareholders and 
directors, as well as being a shareholder in 
its subsidiary company, Tutuman Integrated 
Products Ltd (TIPL). Mr Maraleu is described 
in the same document as a shareholder 
in TIPL but not TDL (TDL 2009b: 14–15). 
Other sources indicate that Mrs Rauveve 
formerly managed the Kavieng office of 
the National Forest Service, while the third 
national director of TDL is her former boss 
from the Rabul regional office, Debon Logo 
(Anon.: 2003). 
7. The total surface area of the main island of 
Lavongai is approximately 118,000 hectares.
8. The front cover of this report misleadingly 
states that it relates to the “Central New 
Ireland ‘Special Agriculture and Business 
Lease’, Namatanai District, New Ireland 
Province”. As we have seen, TDL was 
exporting logs from the Central New Ireland 
TRP area in 2007, but no SABL has been 
granted over this area. 
9. “We declare our fourth goal to be for 
Papua New Guinea’s natural resources 
and environment to be conserved and 
used for the collective benefit of us all, 
and be replenished for the benefit of future 
generations.”
10. Tukul’s father, Walla Gukguk, was jailed 
by the Australian colonial administration 
for his role in leading a micro-nationalist 
movement commonly known as the 
“Johnson Cult” (Billings 1969). He was the 
MP for Kavieng Open Electorate between 
1977 and 1982. 
11. The group was said to have lodged its 
objections to the Environmental Impact 
Statement after it had been submitted 
to the Department of Environment and 
Conservation in March 2010. As previously 
noted, the document itself is dated to the 
previous November. It is often difficult to 
establish the gap in time which may have 
elapsed between the preparation and 
submission of such documents.
12.  Acting Prime Minister Sam Abal announ-
ced his government’s intention to institute 
a Commission of Inquiry at the beginning 
of May (Post-Courier, 6 May 2011), and 
followed this up with publication of the 
Commission’s terms of reference in July 
(Sunday Chronicle, 3 July 2011). The Com-
mission was expected to make its report to 
Parliament by the end of September.
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